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That a radical transformation has taken place in the Irish economy is indisputable and 
has been very fully captured in the accompanying paper by Pat McArdle (CIT 
Working Paper 052212).  The impact of this radical change is most vividly seen in the 
changing demographics of Ireland. The long-term trend in the population from 1851 
to 1961 was downward. The population of the Republic of Ireland more than halved 
so that by 1961 the population was 2.9 million. This trend has been reversed to such 
an extent that Ireland now experiences net immigration and is recording among the 
highest growth rates in population in Europe. At the same time the total at work are 
more than 2.1 million, the highest in living memory. In parallel the level of 
unemployment has fallen, and the structure of the public finances has been 
dramatically improved. 
 
The factors that brought about these changes are many and varied. My task is to 
consider the role of public policy in facilitating this transformation. My analysis is 
partial and is informed primarily by my own experience in the implementation of 
development policies in Ireland for more than twenty years. 
 
In my judgement, a number of public policies played essential roles in Ireland’s 
transformation, including: 
 
-  The recognition by a coherent group of leaders /opinion formers of where we 
stood in 1986 and the resulting evolvement of the concept of social 
partnership 
-  The societal value placed on education and the acceleration of investment in 
education, particularly up to and including undergraduate level from the late 
1960s 
-  An evolving policy towards lower taxation rates across a range of areas  
-  A consistent commitment to the attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
-  An evolving development of policies focussed on internationalisation of 
local companies 
 
                                                   
1 Presentation to EUROBANK CONFERENCE “SOURCES OF GROWTH: CAN GREECE 
FOLLOW THE IRISH EXAMPLE?” October 2005, Athens, Greece. 
 
2 The author is currently Chairman of the Governing Authority of the National University of Ireland, 
Maynooth; he is Chairman of Duolog Holdings and is a non-executive director of Project Management 
Holdings, National Irish Bank and the Digital Hub Development Agency. He was CEO of Enterprise 
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expressed in this paper are those of the author alone. More recently this strategy has been modulated towards a more aggressive investment 
level in transportation and in the scientific research infrastructure of the country. 
 
2. WHERE WERE WE IN 1986? 
 
The trends in the Irish economy over the period 1980 to 1985 presented a very bleak 
outlook.  A small number of indicators capture the essence of the dilemma we faced at 
the time: 
 
-  Almost one in five of the labour force was unemployed (up from one in 
twelve in 1980) 
-  The National debt trebled in the same period and the debt/GNP ratio had 
increased from 88% to 148%, and  
-  National output in 1986 was no higher than it had been six years earlier. 
 
These, and other data, were the subjects of detailed analysis in 1986 by the National 
Economic and Social Council.  NESC was a body comprised of the main interest 
groups in Ireland—i.e., trade unions, employers, agriculture and Government 
nominees. The Council had been established to provide a forum for the discussion of 
the principles relating to the efficient development of the national economy and to 
advise the Government on these matters. The Council became so concerned with the 
scale of the economic problems facing the economy that it decided to carry out a 
major analysis of the relevant issues and to recommend a range of proposals. 
 
The fundamental conclusion of NESC was that the two major issues facing the 
economy, chronic levels of unemployment and major imbalances in the public 
finances, were both symptoms of the same problem—the lack of growth. The Council 
was adamant that a continuation of existing policies was utterly unacceptable and that 
radical change in strategy was vital.  
 
The Council saw the clear need to do the following: 
-  Reduce the debt/GNP ratio 
-  Restore order to the public finances through cuts in public expenditure  
-  Enhance the competitiveness of the economy without resorting to adjusting 
the exchange rate  
-  Enact tax reform, involving widening the tax base while reducing tax rates 
and 
-  Conduct an active industrial policy, including the attraction of FDI as well as 
the internationalisation of local firms. 
 
The later part of this paper will discuss the manner in which the policy on industrial 
development was implemented. However, I intend firstly to make some observations 
on how this overall strategy gained support, the significance of tax policy and the role 




The nature of the Irish economy and its society had for more than a century a 
predominant and depressing theme and that was emigration.  In the period between 
the mid 1850s and the mid 1950’s, the population of Ireland halved, essentially due to 
  2 emigration. The birth rate remained high, but increasingly the dependency ratio rose 
and the labour participation rate stagnated or fell. During the early 1960’s an active 
policy debate began on the potential role that education could have in changing our 
economic fortunes. The counter arguments asked why we should expend scarce 
national resources on widespread education when most of those who would benefit 
would almost certainly emigrate—in essence, the transfer of well educated human 
capital from an underdeveloped economy, Ireland, to other more developed 
economies, mainly Britain and the US.  
 
Notwithstanding some of these arguments, the Irish Government introduced free 
universal access to second level education [equivalent to U.S. high school] in the mid 
1960’s and followed this in 1969 by significantly widening access to tertiary 
education [equivalent to U.S. college or post-secondary technical education]. This 
was followed rapidly by the expansion of the capacity of the existing five universities, 
the addition of two new universities with a decidedly business /engineering /science 
orientation, as well as the establishment of nine Institutes of Technology which 
initially focussed on the provision of technical education at sub-primary degree level 
[i.e., less than university-level—like South Carolina’s system of TECs]. 
 
The effect of this policy was to radically increase the participation rate in education 
and to underline the fundamental value placed by Irish society on the role and 
relevance of education.  
   
This was not an easy policy to pursue, especially in the early 1980’s when there was 
no growth in the economy, when there was severe strain on public finances and when 
emigration was continuing. Particular emphasis had been placed on increasing the 
volume of graduates in electronics and software, on the basis that these sectors had 
the potential for substantial growth. However in 1984 in the case of one of the newer 
universities, the first graduate class in electronic engineering all emigrated while in 
the case of one of the older universities over 80% of following year’s software 
graduates were recruited by a single major international firm which transferred them 
to work at the companies research centre in Europe.  In these circumstances, it 
required considerable administrative and political determination to persist with a 
policy that did not appear to be delivering immediate returns to the economy. 
 
The pattern of participation in third level education [university-level] changed 
dramatically between 1965/66 and 2002/03, and the impact in terms of educational 
attainment was most evident at the end of this period. During this time the number of 
persons in full-time education in third level jumped from 20,698 to 137,323, an 
increase of more than 550%. Expressed as a participation rate of the most relevant age 
cohort (20 –24 years of age) the rate rose from 11.1% to 41.8%. The impact of this 
long-term trend in improved participation became particularly evident between 1996 
and 2002 as measured by the % of the 25-29-age cohort that had achieved a primary 
[BA/BS] or higher degree.  The participation rate, so defined, increased on average 
from 15.5% to 25.5 % over the six years. It is of particular interest that the 
comparable data for women in the same period increased more rapidly, from 16.2% to 
28.5 %. In 2005 it is reasonable to suggest that close to one in every three women in 
the 25-29 age cohort in Ireland hold primary-or-higher university degrees. 
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international economy took place during the 1990’s, Ireland was particularly well 
placed—especially in relation to the growth in the IT and pharmaceutical sectors .The 
nature of the human capital had been substantially enhanced and was on an upward 
trend. Furthermore, many of those who emigrated, especially in the early 1980’s, 
began to return to Ireland, having acquired very valuable experience in international 
business for which there was now a ready market in their home country. These skill 
sets were attractive to international firms setting up in Ireland but also to an emerging 
cohort of mainly technology based start-ups.  
 
4. TAXATION POLICIES 
 
The changes in taxation policy have been described elsewhere, so as a consequence I 
will limit my observations to the impact of these developments. Irish development 
strategy had since 1955 used tax (and in particular corporation tax) as an active policy 
instrument. There were two guiding principles that evolved over the ensuing decades: 
 
-  The availability/access to lower tax rates was based on a transparent process, 
and  
-  Where changes in tax rates were envisaged, they were signalled well in 
advance and all existing commitments were honoured. 
 
The effect of this approach gave confidence to international investors of Ireland’s 
intentions and had the effect of providing certainty without the necessity to provide 
guarantees. This was underpinned by the acceptance by virtually all shades of 
political opinion in Ireland of the relevance of this approach to development policy. 
This issue did not become a matter of policy difference between the major political 
parties or successive Governments. This approach has been re-enforced most recently 
in Ireland, as political debate has been initiated in the lead-up to the next general 
election, which must take place by 2007. The two largest opposition parties have 
already clearly signalled their commitment to the existing policy on corporation tax.  
 
Low corporation tax rates are most relevant where businesses are already profitable, 
but not as immediately relevant to the growth of emerging companies where the more 
critical issue is the attraction of equity investment and the potential reward for risk 
taking. In this case the lowering of the capital gains tax rate from 40% to 20 % in 
1997 was key. I will return to this issue later. 
 
5. BUILDING TRUST AND CONFIDENCE. 
 
When the NESC published its report in 1986, it was clear on two issues: that the 
recommendations needed to be endorsed and implemented as a whole, and—given the 
nature of the challenges that had to be faced—it was essential that the policy enjoyed 
widespread support or at least did not encounter widespread opposition. When steps 
were taken to reduce Government expenditures in subsequent years, it involved 
difficult choices that included reductions in public sector employment. For example in 
IDA Ireland, the agency charged with attracting FDI, the budgetary cut backs that 
were a key element in the recovery plan required a reduction in staff numbers of 20%.  
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and 1991, especially as output began to rise but with no apparent recovery in 
aggregate employment. An active debate began among economists on the issue of 
“jobless growth”.  
 
A process that was key to a broadly-based level of support for the new strategy can be 
captured in the concept described as Social Partnership. This process involved the 
representatives of the major sectors in the economy agreeing with the Government on 
the major key economic priorities. Through this mechanism, wage cost increases in 
the economy were negotiated. The evolution of this concept of partnership between 
the major social /economic players and Government is firmly rooted in the work and 
relationships which developed as the NESC report of 1986 was prepared. The major 
economic sectors had worked together to analyse the critical issues facing the Irish 
economy, had arrived at crucial, difficult conclusions and were committed to the 
implementation of this strategy. Without that shared understanding and trust, the 
commitment necessary to gain broad public support to deal with the difficulties that 
would have to be encountered and managed could not have been garnered.  
 
6. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
 
The attraction of inward investment into Ireland was initiated in the mid 1950’s in 
response to a severe balance of payments problem, which at that point was a major 
constraint on the growth of the economy. The concept was to actively encourage 
exports by offering tax breaks on profits earned from international sales. This 
provided the first basis on which efforts were made to attract international investors 
into Ireland. New institutional structures were established that evolved into IDA 
Ireland which in 1970 was reconstituted as a corporate body, staffed by appropriately 
skilled professionals, with considerable executive independence but within the context 
of a policy framework established by Government. 
 
The pattern of inward investment had a number of evolving phases. During the 1960s 
much of the investment was derived from family owned firms that originated in 
Europe and focussed on supplying the UK market, with which Ireland had a Free 
Trade Area Agreement. From 1970, the primary source of FDI into Ireland was the 
US. This was triggered by Ireland’s planned entry into the EU in 1973, the access to 
the major European markets which membership conferred and the growth ambitions 
of US firms wishing to penetrate the EU market. The 1980’s were a difficult period 
for FDI as the Irish economy lost competitiveness and as international confidence in 
the economy weakened. The pace of inward investment recovered from 1989, marked 
by the decision of Intel to establish a chip fabrication plant in Ireland with an 
investment value of $350 million. Securing this investment provide affirmation that 
the economy was in strong recovery mode and gave a clear signal to the international 
community of the growing confidence in Ireland.  The pace of development and the 
impact of FDI on the economy are reflected in the increase in employment in the 
sector from 92,000 in 1995 to almost 129,000 in 2004.  Exports by the sector now 
amount to more than $70 billion. 
 
The crucial question is why did FDI grow so rapidly in this more recent period? 
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appreciation of the US$ created a dynamic where US firms had a real business need 
and a desire to invest internationally. The growing integration of the European 
economy created demand conditions which many US firms were keen to exploit. 
Ireland was well placed to participate in this process. We were seen as country that 
was fully committed to the integration process and unambiguous in its commitment to 
European development. 
 
Labour costs were competitive and the transformation in the quality and composition 
of the labour force, to which I have referred earlier, matched the growing demands of 
the international firms who chose Ireland.  Low corporation tax played a vital role, as 
to some extent did the use of grant incentives. 
 
To fully understand why this growth took place requires recognition that, in Ireland’s 
case at least, success was based not only on seeing FDI as a process of economic 
development but as a business process. It is certainly the case that without the 
economic preconditions that already existed, the opportunity to attract major flows of 
FDI would not have arisen. But it can be reasonably claimed that the manner in which 
Ireland sought to attract international investors played a key role also. 
 
At the centre of this was recognition by Governments, administrators, social partners 
and the relevant agencies that a sustained commitment to attracting inward investment 
was a key to the recovery of the economy. This demanded a responsive and pragmatic 
approach by the key elements in the public sector to the opportunities that developed.  
 
It also meant that to some extent Ireland had to “rewrite the rules of the game” and 
needed to manage  the process of securing inward investment as a business process 
and not only as an economic development process. The largest source of FDI 
investment was the US and much of this investment was directed towards Europe – 
but to the larger economies in Europe. To secure a share of this investment required 
not only that Ireland had something to offer, but we needed to know to whom should 
it be offered, and we needed to present it with a level of service exceeding that of our 
competitors. This manifested itself in seeking to find either first mover advantage or 
opportunities that were not being fully exploited by other locations. This could be 
described as industrial planning but in reality it was a process of informed and 
sophisticated market research based upon gained experience. This is illustrated by the 
identification and early exploitation of the software sector in the 1980’s, call centres 
and shared services in the early 1990’s, e-business and biopharmaceuticals more 
recently. 
 
The business model associated with attracting inward investment is essentially B-to-B 
or can be described as being very similar to the capital goods sector.  It involves, on a 
world wide basis, a relatively small number of potential customers (compared to the 
retail sector), the individual transactions are relatively large, and direct contact with 
decision makers is essential.   Ireland—through its development agencies, its financial 
institutions, legal and other support organisations such as engineering design—has 
developed a significant collective competence in selling to and servicing the needs of 
international investors. Today there are only three locations in the world having 
special competence in the design and commissioning of biopharmaceutical plants, an 
area of substantial growth. The presence of such capability in a location gives that 
 6  country a source of competitive advantage in attracting such investment.  Ireland is 
one of those three locations. 
 
In summary the creation of systems and clear capability in the business of attracting 
investment, a specific objective of public policy, was a key element in the rapid 
expansion of FDI in Ireland in recent years. 
 
7. INTERNATIONALISATION OF LOCAL FIRMS  
 
The growth rate of local Irish companies over the past fifteen years was not at the 
same pace as that of the international firms. Not withstanding this overall trend, 
substantial international Irish companies emerged in building materials, food 
ingredients, consumer foods, paper and software. Public policy in relation to the 
internationalisation of local Irish companies, particularly in the 1980’s, was not as 
innovative or pursued as aggressively as was the case in relation to FDI. A number of 
initiatives were taken to address the availability of equity finance, especially for early 
phase companies. Among them was the establishment of a Government owned equity 
house, NadCorp. This was not a success, but it laid the groundwork for an initiative to 
create a more active early-phase equity market in 1994 following the establishment of 
Enterprise Ireland which had the responsibility of supporting the internationalisation 
of Irish companies. The concept was to establish a fund or funds in which the public 
sector and the private sector would co-finance and share the risks and rewards on an 
equal footing. The first attempt to commence this process started in 1994 with a 
proposal to establish a single fund. The rationale was that a larger fund could operate 
more efficiently from a cost viewpoint. This fund did not materialise because it was 
not possible to bring together a sufficient number of investors. A second attempt was 
made to establish a series of funds with typically an initial fund size of $25 million 
financed on a 50:50 basis between the public and private sector.  In this instance the 
private sector partner had sole responsibility for the investment strategy within 
broadly defined sectors.  
 
This approach was successful, both in terms of establishing the funds and in creating a 
competitive VC environment such that companies had alternative suppliers of venture 
capital. This initiative had the effect of increasing the availability of funding, 
deepening the level of VC capability in the Irish economy, and increasing the number 
of VC funds from 2 in 1994 to almost 20 in 2004. Under this programme a total of 
more than €250million was invested in 200 early phases, mainly technology-based 
firms. 
 
From the perspective of the development of public policy, the investment in VC funds 
had of course risks attached to it, but it was one of the early examples where strategy 
proposals for this sector focussed more clearly on the needs of the local companies 
and not on adapting instruments that were more relevant to overseas companies. This 
was a significant learning experience and provided an impetus for further initiatives, 
including more active support for local Irish companies in identifying market 
opportunities and assisting them in gaining access to such markets. It led also to the 
establishment of incubators units for Irish companies in key international locations 
such as Silicon Valley, New York and Tokyo where the provision and availability of 
appropriate office accommodation, in familiar surroundings meant that the marketing 
executives from emerging young technology companies could immediately focus on 
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surroundings. 
 
The decision by the Irish Government in 1997 to reduce the level of Capital Gains 
Tax from 40% to 20% was a significant departure in policy. The impact of this 
decision was not only to more than double the tax yield, but also—more importantly 
in my view—to create liquidity in the investment market and to signal investors that 
commercial risk taking and wealth creation would be rewarded. For emerging young 
technology companies and their investors, this was a very welcome development, and 
it strengthened the initiatives already taken to develop an active and competitive 
venture capital market. 
 
8. WHERE TO NOW?  
 
The particular focus on attracting FDI and on investing in third level education, 
especially up to primary degree (BA/BS) level, meant that resources were not as 
available for other developments. Some spare capacity existed in the road 
infrastructure toward the end of the 1980’s, but as the economy expanded rapidly the 
need to accelerate investment in the road infrastructure became more acute. To 
achieve the needed road infrastructure investment has required the development of 
public private partnerships as well as the presence in Ireland of international 
contractors who have added to our delivery capacity. 
 
The changing nature of our labour costs and the need to create a new source of 
competitiveness gave rise to a decision by the Government to create a new 
organisation, Science Foundation Ireland, in 2000 and to establish it on a statutory 
basis in 2003 to support and attract academics researching in key technologies related 
to information technology and biotechnology. The establishment of SFI followed the 
acceptance by the Irish Government of the conclusions of a major technology 
foresight exercise, which concluded that Ireland’s competitive position had to be 
underpinned by enhanced investment in research in a number of key areas. The five-
year budget allocation for this programme is over $750 million, and it has provided a 
significant uplift in the scale and depth of relevant research taking place in Irish 
universities and creating closer collaboration between industry and the research 
community.      
 
9.  FINALLY 
 
The scale of the transformation in the Irish economy has raised employment and real 
income levels. New challenges have materialised, particularly in relation to 
infrastructural deficits and raising our universities to a “fourth level”.   
 
Unravelling the past is a complex process, and it was the interplay of circumstances, 
opportunity, some long-term investment, determination and a focus on a small 
number of key issues, which provided the basis for the success that was achieved.  
Public policy played its role in this process.  
 
Our challenge is to now drive to a new level of development, which will require an 
equal level of determination and effort. Public policy will have to continue to reinvent 
itself. Delivering change in a context of success can in some instances be even more 
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by this but, perhaps have to be alert to the words of The Black Prince: 
 
“It should be borne in mind that there is nothing more difficult to arrange, more 
doubtful of success and more dangerous to carry through, than initiating changes in 
the State’s arrangements  
The innovator makes enemies of all those who prospered under the old order, and 
only lukewarm support is forthcoming from those who would prosper under the new“  
(Machiavelli)  
 
That is what makes developing and implementing public policy so challenging and 
interesting!   
 
 
4 October 2005 
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